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TERROR AND THE LAW: THE UNILATERAL
USE OF FORCE AND THE JUNE 1993
BOMBING OF BAGHDAD
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 26, 1993, U.S. missiles destroyed the Iraqi intelligence
complex in downtown Baghdad in response to an alleged Iraqi
assassination plot against former President George Bush. This U.S.
military action renews the debate about the unilateral use of force in
the post-cold war era. The U.S. administration's justification for its
defensive use of force against Iraq is significant because of the
potential impact that a superpower's actions can have on the
development of international law.' It is essential that explanations
for controversial uses of force be grounded in law, not expediency.
However, in order to influence state policy, international law must
also be interpreted in light of the evolving nature of aggression and
responses thereto.
Reflecting a desire for stability, the post-cold war years have
been marked by an increased interest in the use of collective, as
opposed to unilateral, force.2 Within a system of collective security,
obtaining the approval of the U.N. Security Council for a belligerent
operation requires states to justify their proposed actions under
international law and to present the evidence underlying the necessity
of a forceful response.3 The Baghdad raid illustrates the existing
tension between furthering multilateralism and defending rights
inherent in sovereignty, such as the protection of a nation's leaders.
It also exemplifies the effect of a politically-charged situation on the
interpretation of international law. The recent history of U.S.-Iraqi
1. Because state practice is one essential source of international law, it follows that the
more powerful states will have greater influence on the development of international law. For
a general discussion of state practice as a source of international law, see J. STARKE, INTRODUC-
TION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-38 (1984).
2. The Gulf War coalition is the paradigmatic example of the use of collective force.
3. Article 51 of the U.N. Charter states: "Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
... self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council. ... " U.N. CHARTER
art. 51; see also infra notes 53-60 and accompanying text (noting that, although the United States
did not seek prior Security Council approval for the Baghdad raid, it did seek to present
evidence and a legal justification for the raid).
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relations and the U.S. desire to punish Iraq, combined with pressure
from the public and the press, led the Clinton administration to act
unilaterally and bypass the United Nations.4  Because the U.N.
process had proven effective as a means of combatting various Iraqi
aggressions (primary among them Iraq's incursion into Kuwait), the
United States' avoidance of those processes is noteworthy.
Without a pre-strike approval from the United Nations, the
United States needed an adequate legal justification for the its
military action. Modem notions of self-defense or reasonable reprisal
provided a sufficient legal basis for a forceful response to a specific
Iraqi aggression-the alleged assassination plot. Less convincing was
the proposition that the bombing was justified in order to deter
indefinite future threats.
This Note explores the derivation and effects of the United
States's legal justification for unilateral action against Iraq. Part II
evaluates the factual circumstances of the incident.' Along with a
presentation of the Clinton administration's legal argument, Part III
addresses both the international reaction to the raid and state practice
with regard to assassinations. Part IV introduces the issue of
unilateral versus collective security. As Part IV demonstrates, an
effective legal analysis of the Baghdad raid must provide for the
evolution of self-defense law in order to meet the exigencies of
terrorist violence. An evolving norm of self-defense, however,
necessitates a stricter reviewing process to evaluate unilateral uses of
force. Such an international review inevitably will be affected by the
political and security concerns of states, as demonstrated in Parts IV
and V. Part V further tests the limits of the self-defense theory,
examining the administration's action in light of reprisal law. Part VI
concludes by proposing the alternative possibility of a multilateral
response to assassination threats.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The expectations of what states will do in a given situation is
dependent upon the circumstances of that situation. Thus, the factual
background in which an event occurs is important. The 1991 Gulf
4. See infra, notes 6-8, 43 and accompanying text.
5. Although the publicly released facts express doubt as to whether Iraq actually ordered
the assassination of former President Bush, for the purposes of legal analysis the allegations
against Iraq are assumed to be true (with exceptions made when doubts about Iraqi complicity
impact legal analyses).
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War and its repercussions underlie questions about the use of force
against Iraq. Ever since the U.S.-led, and U.N.-approved, coalition
expelled the Iraqi army from Kuwait, the world has searched for a
way to deal effectively with Saddam Hussein.
In the months before the bombing, Iraq was consistently testing
the limits of international resolve. Iraq threatened Allied "no-fly"
zones6 and menaced the Kurds in northern Iraq.7  Immediately
before the U.S. raid on Baghdad, the Security Council was involved
in a test of wills with Saddam Hussein concerning surveillance of
Iraq's missile test sites.8 In short, the post-Gulf war behavior of Iraq
was far from peaceful.
A. The Bombing of Iraqi Intelligence Headquarters in Baghdad
Iraqi intelligence headquarters9 was destroyed by twenty-three
Tomahawk cruise missiles fired from U.S. Naval warships in the Red
Sea and the Persian Gulf.' Though the Pentagon reported that the
bombing was scheduled for the middle of the night so as to avoid
civilian casualties," three missiles went off course and landed in a
residential neighborhood in Baghdad. 2 The official Iraqi news
agency INA reported eight civilians killed.'
Domestically, President Clinton enjoyed overwhelming popular
support for the bombing. A joint poll by the New York Tnes and
6. Iraqi gunners fired on U.S. jets more than two months before the bombing. Eric
Schmitt, Iraqi Gunners Fire on American Jets in Norah, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1993,
§ 1, at 1. Iraq continued to threaten the zones after the Baghdad raid. A U.S. fighter pilot fired
at an Iraqi antiaircraft artillery site on June 29th, after Iraqi radar marked his plane. Douglas
Jehl, U.S. Jet Patrolling Iraq Fires Missile at Artillery Site, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1993, at A3.
The same type of incident occurred on July 25th. Stephen Engelberg, Another U.S. Jet on Patrol
Fires at Iraqi Antiaircraft Battery, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 1993, at A6.
7. Youssef M. Ibrahim, Trial of 14 in Plot Resumes, But U.S. Verdict is Known, N.Y.
TIMES, June 27, 1993, § 1, at 12.
8. Before the strike, President Clinton warned Iraq that it must let U.N. officials monitor
missile test sites. The Security Council passed a resolution admonishing Iraq to allow U.N.
inspectors to install cameras at missile test sites or face "serious consequences." Douglas Jehl,
Clinton Bluntly Warns Iraq to Yield to Arms Inspectors, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1993, §1, at 4.
Iraq finally agreed to allow surveillance cameras at missile testing sites, as per U.N. agreement,
on July 22nd. Engelberg, supra note 6.
9. Iraqi intelligence is known as the "Mukhabarat."
10. Gwen Ifill, Clinton Bluntly Reports 'Compelling Evidence' Found Against Iraq, N.Y.
TIMEs, June 27, 1993, § 1, at 1.
11. Tim Weiner, Attack is Aimed at the Heart of Iraq's Spy Network, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1993, § 1, at 1.
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CBS indicated that the president's approval rating increased eleven
percent immediately after the raid. 4 The U.S. Congress also
expressed its approval, demonstrating bipartisan support for the
military action.' What little criticism existed was centered upon the
fear in some quarters that the use of force was becoming increasingly
unregulated.
16
B. The Threat Against Former President Bush
Controversy surrounds the evidence upon which the Clinton
administration based its decision to use force against Iraq. Critics
such as journalist Seymour Hersh 7 claim that the evidence which
was made public was weak and circumstantial. Specifically at issue
was the design of the assassination weapon, the veracity of the
suspected assassins, and the motives of the Kuwaiti government.
Proponents of the administration's position claim that the most
compelling evidence supporting the decision was too sensitive to be
made public and that there was no doubt that Iraq was behind an
assassination plot against former President Bush.'
Credible evidence and suspicions both supported the
administration's conclusions and the criticism thereof For example,
former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Director Robert Gates
cited a 1992 CIA warning of a possible attempt by Iraq to assassinate
a top government official in retaliation for its defeat in the Gulf
War.' However, another CIA report stated that Kuwait may have
14. Douglas Jehl, U.S. Says It Waited for Certain Proof Before Iraq Raid, N.Y. TIMEs, June
29, 1993, at Al. The poll found that two-thirds supported the air strike and sixty percent
supported Clinton's stand toward Iraq. Richard L Berke, Poll Shows Raid on Iraq Buoyed
Clinton's Popularity, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 1993, at A7.
15. The ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Richard
Lugar, endorsed "sure and swift" U.S. retaliation against Iraq. Douglas Jehl, Car Bomb Found
Near Bush Said to Suggest Hand of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 11, 1993, at A3. The Democratic
chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, Senator Dennis DeConcini, said, "If there is real
credible information [against Iraq], the United States should in my view take unilateral action-a
bombing or other air strike." Id.
16. A New York Times editorial stated, "Surely the Administration does not intend to
usher in an age when nations feel free to fire weapons at each other's cities based on unilateral
assertions that intelligence evidence justifies it." Still Not Good Enough on Iraq, N.Y. TIMES,
June 30, 1993, at A14.
17. See generally Seymour Hersh, A Case Not Closed, NEW YoRKER, Nov. 1, 1993, at'80.
18. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
19. Jehl, supra note 14.
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manufactured evidence to make an unrelated plot seem like an
assassination attempt. °
The chain of events which triggered the U.S. bombing began in
April of 1993. Kuwaiti officials informed Washington of a plot
against the life of the former President after some of the alleged
conspirators confessed.21 One accused leader, Wali al-Ghazali, stated
that Iraqi intelligence ordered him to move a bomb-rigged jeep to a
location near the Kuwait University area, where Mr. Bush was to
receive an honorary degree during his April 1993 visit.' The bomb
was to be detonated while Mr. Bush was giving his speech. U.S.
authorities determined that the explosion would be powerful enough
to injure people within a radius of 400 yards.' Administration
officials concluded that Iraqi agents intended to kill former President
Bush on his visit to Kuwait.24
C. The U.S. Investigation
Given the political pressure to respond to an assassination
attempt on a former President and the anti-Iraq sentiments prevalent
among the U.S. public, the administration wanted to compile
conclusive evidence before making a forceful response Secret
Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and CIA officials were
dispatched to Kuwait to undertake a thorough investigation of the
collected evidence Although not able to establish conclusively
that the assassination plot was ordered by Saddam Hussein or the
head of Iraqi intelligence, the CIA remained convinced that Iraqi
intelligence was involved.27
20. Douglas JehI, U.S. Defers Response to Iraqis' Plot Against Bush, N.Y. TIMWES, June 8,
1993, at A13. Kuwaiti evidence has proved unreliable in the past. During the Gulf War, an
adolescent Kuwaiti girl testified before Congress that Iraq had removed babies from incubators
in Kuwaiti hospitals. Journalists and human rights groups have questioned the accuracy of her
testimony, noting that the girl turned out to be the daughter of Kuwait's ambassador to the
United States. Hersch, supra note 18, at 81.
21. See Douglas Jehl, U.S. Convinced Iraqi Saboteurs Plotted to Kill Bush, N.Y. TIMES, May
8, 1993, § 1, at 5. Kuwait arrested 16 people, including 11 Iraqi nationals. Id.
22. Ibrahim, supra note 7. Wali al-Ghazali claimed, "They told me to kill Bush." Jehl,
supra note 21. The ringleader, Raad al-Assadi, maintained that he did not know that Bush was
the target. Id.
23. U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3245th mtg. at 4, U.N. Doc. SIPV.3245 (1993).
24. Jehl, supra note 20.
25. Jehl, supra note 14.
26. Id.
27. In fact, administration officials indicated that the attack was limited because of the lack
of direct evidence linking the plot to Hussein. See JehI, supra note 14.
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Information from the alleged assassins constituted a significant
part of the U.S. investigation. After allegedly aborting the assassina-
tion plan the suspects were found wandering in the desert by Kuwaiti
authorities.' FBI and CIA agents questioned the suspects on at
least two occasions in April and May of 1993,29 after the leaders of
the plot had confessed to the Kuwaiti authorities." The intervention
by these U.S. agencies was prompted by the concern that the suspects'
confessions to the Kuwaitis had been extracted by torture?1
However, the FBI found no evidence of coercion or physical
torture.32
Interviews with the suspects led the CIA to conclude that the
group was amateurish,33 although the agency believed that at least
one suspect was familiar with the Iraqi intelligence structure in
Basra.' The alleged assassins never came close to their goal of
placing a bomb near Kuwait University during the former President's
visit3 However, neither the CIA nor the FBI discounted the
Kuwaiti assessment that these suspects were part of an Iraqi-backed
assassination plot. Rather, administration officials contended that it
was conceivable that Iraq deliberately enlisted the aid of amateurs.
Iraq would have expected that the amateurs were more likely to be
killed during the attempt on former President Bush's life, thereby
foreclosing the probability of discovery of Iraq's involvement. The
lack of conclusive evidence of Iraqi involvement would have enabled
Saddam Hussein to test the resolve of the U.S. government without
directly challenging the "No Fly Zones," harassing the Kurds, and
28. Hersh, supra note 18, at 89.
29. Youssef Ibrahim, Suspects' Haste a Puzzle in Kuwait Trail, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 1993,
§1, at 22.
30. See Jehl, supra note 21.
31. See Jehl, supra note 14. A German news agency reported that one suspect had been
harshly beaten after his arrest. He signed a confession but proclaimed his innocence on the
witness stand. During interviews with U.S. officials, the suspect reported that he had been
beaten. His attorney told U.S. officials that suspects were routinely beaten by Kuwaiti police.
Hersh, supra note 18, at 90.
32. Hersh, supra note 18, at 84. The FBI did not conduct medical tests on the suspects to
determine whether or not they were tortured. lId. at 90.
33. For example, one suspect, who had been recruited in early April for the mission, had
been a male nurse in An Najaf, Iraq. Another suspect had been the owner of a coffee shop in
Basra, Iraq. Id. at 91.
34. Id. at 92.
35. The bomb-rigged cruiser was found by Kuwait police outside of Kuwait City. Scott
Baldauf, Defendants in Kuwait Deny Conspiracy in Trial of Attempt of Bush's Life, CHRIST. SCi.
MONITOR, July, 1993, at 7.
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stalling U.N. inspectors.36 Moreover, if they managed to survive and
were caught, these amateurs would not be able to give the U.S.
authorities any significant information on Iraqi intelligence activi-
ties ?7
The most important finding derived from the investigation by the
CIA and FBI was the similarity between the bomb recovered in
Kuwait 8 and other Iraqi bombs used in the past 9 National Securi-
ty Advisor Anthony Lake claimed that the soldering method and
wiring of the Kuwait University bomb bore an Iraqi "signature."'
Other analysts, however, have questioned the credibility of this
evidence. Seymour Hersh interviewed several bomb experts, some of
whom testified that it was impossible to identify signature traits in
bombs of this nature, because the devices in question were made of
routine electronic parts.4' In response, other bomb experts certified
that distinguishing characteristics could be identified in the bomb, but
that the evidence of these characteristics had not been released to the
public for security reasons.42
The lack of publicly available information prompted administra-
tion critics to create alternative theories as to why the administration
acted as it did. Hersh claims the administration was driven to take
quick and strong action because it feared that the results of the FBI's
investigation into the assassination plot would leak to the press.43 A
36. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
37. Hersh, supra note 18, at 92.
38. The bomb was rigged in a Toyota land cruiser. Jehl, supra note 14.
39. For example, Iraqi devices found in Turkey during the Gulf War. See Ibrahim, supra
note 7.
40. Hersh, supra note 18, at 84.
41. For instance, a photograph of the remote control mechanism displayed before the
Security Council actually showed a common commercial item that bore no specific characteris-
tics. One of the experts interviewed by Hersh, Donald L. Hansen, served 28 years on the bomb
squad at the San Francisco Police Department and is now an instructor at the State
Department's school for foreign police officers. He concluded that the devices shown by the
White House were generic and lacked the unique attributes necessary for a signature. Id. at 85.
42. Hersh cites an unnamed analyst now working for the U.S. Government. This analyst
was convinced that Iraq was behind this plot because the components of bombs recovered in
Kuwait and other known Iraqi bombs were similar. He stated that there was other information
which was not made public for fear of alerting the Iraqis to what the U.S. government knew.
Id. at 86, 88. This theory was supported by the chief of the FBI's counterterrorism section Neil
Gallagher, who stated "[w]hat was made public was not the best case. There are other
photographs." IL at 88.
43. Hersch claims that the administration feared that New York Times columnist William
Safire would have the report within days after its release. Id. at 80. The Wall Street Journal
anticipated the coming of the FBI report with the headline on June 23rd: "For the President,
It's Decision Time on Attacking Iraq." The article spoke of a confidential report that Clinton
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leak of the FBI report and the subsequent failure of the United States
to respond would have weakened the country's international stature.
For example, Saudi Arabia apparently advised a strong U.S, action on
grounds that, "if people think they can get away with this, you'll [the
United States] have no credibility in the Middle East."' Hersh
posits that Kuwait intentionally misled the United States regarding
Iraq in order to prevent a reconciliation between the two countries.45
It appears that the administration did not weigh its policy options
very long, despite its investigation into the assassination plot.
President Clinton received the joint CIA and FBI report regarding the
investigation on June 24, 1993. Both the Pentagon and the CIA
argued that a state conspiracy against the life of a former President
required forceful action against the Iraqi government.46 Senior
administration officials further indicated that the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the CIA had no doubts that Iraqi intelligence had
conceived an assassination plan against former President Bush.a7
A senior administration official claimed that after the evidence
was presented, "there was absolutely no question about whether to
respond."'  On June 25, President Clinton made the decision to
bomb the Iraqi intelligence headquarters. 49 The President claimed
that there was no prospect for a peaceful solution. Based upon Iraq's
disregard for international law, the administration felt that no
diplomatic or economic measures could deter Iraq from attempting
further assassinations in the future50
While the circumstantial evidence tying Iraq to the assassination
attempt was sufficient to justify the administration's decision, the
unresolved factual issues in the administration's investigation present
problems for a legal evaluation of the raid. Although the issue of the
level of proof needed for a legally valid military strike is one
consideration in evaluating whether the raid was justifiable, more
interesting is the tension that exists between national security
would receive in coming days. Id. at 83.
44. Id. at 81-82 (citing Martin Indyk, senior director of the National Security Council
Division of Near East and South Asian Affairs).
45. See id. at 81-83.
46. Douglas Jehl, U.S. Cites Evidence in a Plot on Bush, N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 1993, § 1, at
9.
47. See Jehl, supra note 14.
48. See Jehl, supra note 46.
49. See fill, supra note 10, at 12.
50. Elaine Sciolino, Clinton Overstates Impact of Raid, His Aids Warn, N.Y. TIMES, June
29, 1993, at A6.
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concerns as a legitimate basis for retaliation and the need for
international accord in enforcement actions. The administration held
back information in its public responses and post-action statements to
the Security Council, citing national security concerns. Although
these concerns may be valid, they represent a major obstacle to an
effective international review of the raid. It is simply more difficult
to mount an effective review if evidence is missing. In the present
state-centered international order, such an obstacle, however, may be
inevitable.
III. LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE RAID ON BAGHDAD
The legal validity of the U.S. raid is questionable because of the
strike's unilateral nature and the lack of U.S. coordination with the
United Nations. However, the United States justified the right to use
unilateral force on grounds that the bombing was a defensive reaction
in response to an attack on the United States.5 ' Such defensive
action is, as the United States suggests, sanctioned under article 51 of
the U.N. Charter.5 2
Unilateral military actions engender a wide range of legal
questions. Forceful means used unilaterally must be defensive and
accepted as such by the international community. Furthermore, the
responding nation's actions must be seen in the context of historical
state practice to similar threats. The following parts of this Note
address these issues.
A. The Security Council Meeting of June 27, 1993
In accordance with article 51, President Clinton called for an
emergency meeting of the Security Council to report on the Iraqi
51. Clinton's Address: Message is "Don't Tread on Us," N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, § 1, at
13. President Clinton asserted that the attempted Iraqi plot was in retaliation for President
Bush's actions as president. Thus, it was an attack on the American people. The President
concluded, "[w]e could not.., let such action against our nation go unanswered." Id. The
President cited four specific bases for military action. First, President Clinton stated that by
replying to the threat to kill a former leader, the administration was protecting U.S. sovereignty.
Second, the raid was an attempt to deter those, such as Saddam Hussein, who were engaged in
state-sponsored terrorism. Third, the President promised to "work to head off emerging
threats." Concomitant to deterring terrorism, the President aimed to prevent further violence
against Americans. Finally, in response to Iraq's repeated violations of international law, the
raid on Baghdad attempted to enforce a norm of civilized behavior amongst nations. Id.
52. Ifll, supra note 10. Article 51 is the Charter's self-defense provision. It allows states
to use force in response to an "armed attack." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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provocation and the subsequent U.S. attack against Iraq.53 At this
meeting U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright,
did not ask the Council for formal approval of the U.S. action.'
Instead, the United States used the session as an opportunity to
present evidence of the Iraqi assassination plot.5 Accordingly,
Ambassador Albright offered evidence of Iraqi complicity in the
attempted attack on former President Bush, including evidence
concerning the origin of the bomb.56 Ambassador Albright com-
pared large photographs of car bombs and their circuitry known to
have been used by Iraqis in earlier attempted terrorist attacks with
evidence of the bomb used in this situation. The Ambassador also
cited FBI findings that remote control firing mechanisms, plastic
explosives, blasting caps, and circuitry and wiring in the Kuwait
University bomb were of the type found only in devices used by Iraqi
terrorists
Ambassador Albright argued that nations are permitted to make
certain assumptions under the circumstances of an assassination
attempt on a former leader. Specifically, she argued that member
states may regard an attack against a former leader as an attack
against the state itself, and react accordingly.58 Thus, the attempted
attack on former President Bush, as an attack on the United States,
gave the United States the right to respond directly under article
5.5  In presenting the U.S. position, the ambassador also empha-
sized the importance of forcing a nation to obey international law.
She stated, "[w]e ignore a crime of this magnitude at our collective
peril as members of an international society that seeks to uphold the
rule of law."' 6
53. See Hersh, supra note 18, at 83-84. Article 51 requires that self.defense measures "shall
be immediately reported to the Security Council." U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
54. U.N. SCOR, 48th Seass., 3245th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/PV.3245 (1993).
55. Ambassador Albright explained the context in which the U.S. action took place, citing
acts of terror by Iraq against U.N. convoys and aid workers in Iraq. Id. at 7. The ambassador
further asserted that Iraq repeatedly violated Security Council resolutions. Id. at 8.
56. Id. at 4-6. Iraqi Ambassador Hamdoon claimed the plot to assassinate Bush was a
fabrication of Kuwaiti government. Id. at 11.
57. Id. at 4-5.
58. Id. at 3.
59. Id. at 6.
60. Id. at 9.
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B. International Reaction
The majority of Security Council members accepted the U.S.
position that the raid was a justified act of self-defense." Although
this acceptance may be explained by the disparity in political power
between the United States and Iraq, it is nonetheless of importance
in establishing whether the United States complied with international
law. 2 Many members cited the evidence presented to them as a
reason for their support.' Great Britain, in particular, sought to
place the U.S. raid in context, pointing to Security Council Resolution
687 of 1991' in which Iraq pledged to cease its practice of state
terrorism."
Governments supporting the U.S. action-outside of the Security
Council-justified the Baghdad raid, under international law, as either
a necessary response to terrorism or as an unavoidable result of a
threatened assassination. British Prime Minister John Major termed
the action a "justified act of self-defense" because of the intolerable
situation created by a threat against former President Bush's life.66
Masamichi Hanabusa, Chief Spokesman of the Japanese Foreign
Ministry, stated, "Japan is of the view that there existed an unavoid-
61. See, e.g., statement of the ambassador of the Russian Federation, Mr. Vorontsov, U.N.
SCOR, supra note 54, at 22. The only nation critical of the U.S. action was China. Ambassador
Li Zhaoxing stated that China would not endorse any action that aggravated tension in the
region. Id. at 21.
62. One measure of an act's compliance with international law is its acceptance by other
nations as legel. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 cmt. c (1986) ("For a practice of states to become a rule of customary
international law it must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal
obligation.").
63. The French representative cited the importance of the evidence laid before the Council.
See statement of Ambassador Mrimnde, U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 13. The Japanese
ambassador noted compelling evidence of Iraqi aggression. Japan saw an "unavoidable
situation" in which the United States had to act. See statement of Ambassador Hatano, id. at
16. Brazil indicated the clear evidentiary link with Iraq as a reason for supporting the U.S.
action. Id. at 18. New Zealand stated that the "professionalism" of U.S. law enforcement
agencies lent particular credibility to Ambassador Albright's presentation. New Zealand
Ambassador Keating claimed that any country faced with this sort of act "would feel obliged
to consider responding with force." See id. at 23.
64. S.C. Res. 687, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2981st mtg. at 9, U.N. Doc. S1RES/687 (1991).
Inter alia, this resolution required "Iraq to inform the Security Council that it will not commit
or support any act of international terrorism... and to condemn unequivocally and renounce
all acts, methods and practices of terrorism ... ." Id. at 32.
65. U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 22.
66. Chris Moncrief, Major Gives Full Backing for Attack on Baghdad, F.B.I.S. (WEU-93-
122), June 28, 1993, at 9.
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able situation where the U.S. could not but take the recent action.,
67
Citing article 51, Belgian Foreign Affairs Minister Willy Claes
maintained that "retaliatory measures were justified" since the U.S.
government had sufficient evidence to implicate Iraq in the assassina-
tion plot.' German Chancellor Helmut Kohl labelled the action "a
justified reaction to a detestable attempted act of terrorism." 69
Nations critical of the raid were less concerned with international
law than with a perceived double standard. For example, several
Islamic nations were unconvinced by U.S. attempts to rationalize the
raid. If the raid was in response to Iraqi transgressions of internation-
al law, the actions were a dramatic departure from previous U.S.
responses to similar situations in other parts of the world. As these
nations pointed out, the United States showed no inclination to bomb
Serbia despite Belgrade's extreme obstinacy in the face of U.N.
resolutions." In fact, Turkey's Prime Minister Tansu Ciller spoke of
the attack as a precedent for action against Serbia.71 Egypt's Foreign
Minister Amr Musa also expressed the hope that the United States
would be as firm toward Bosnia as it had been toward Iraq! 2
67. Japan Offers Tepid Support, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 1993, at A6. This somewhat
lukewarm endorsement of the attack was matched by French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe. He
claimed that "[K]illing a former head of state is something which deserves a reaction and a
strong reaction." See French Ministers, Politicians View Raid on Iraq, LE MONDE (Paris), June
29, 1993, at 5 translated in F.B.I.S. (WEU-93-122), June 29, 1993, at 24. Neither Japan nor
France expressed the opinion that the action was either justified or unjustified as a means of
self-defense.
68. Claes: Baghdad Attack "Clear Signal" to Serbia, F.B.I.S. (WEU 93-126), July 2, 1993,
at 10. Foreign Affairs Minister Claes also cited worldwide frustration with the Iraqi leader
"Saddarn has evidently not learned any lessons from the past." Belgium "Provisionally"
Approves U.S. Attack, DE MORGEN (Brussels), June 28,1993, at 2, translated in F.B.I.S. (WEU-
93-126), July 2,1993, at 10. In line with this notion of enforcing international law through force,
Claes mentioned the raid as a precedent for dealing with Serbian violations of law in Bosnia.
Id.
69. KohL U.S. Attack on Baghdad Justified, F.B.I.S. (WEU-93-122), June 28,1993, at 11.
Italy also considered the U.S. reaction justified in fighting terrorism. See Foreign Ministry
Supports U.S. Attack on Iraq, F.B.I.S. (WEU-93-122), June 28,1993, at 34. In Australia, Foreign
Minister Gareth Evans called the bombing an "understandable" and proportionate reaction to
terrorism. See Minister: U.S. Attack on Iraq "Understandable' F.B.I.S. (EAS-93-122), June 28,
1993, at 71.
70. See Youssef Ibrahim, Islamic Nations See Double Standard in U.S. Raid, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 1993, at A6.
71. Ciller Addresses-Party on U.S. Raid, Azerbaijan, (TRT Television Network, Turkey,
June 29, 1993) translated in F.B.I.S. (WEU-93-124), June 30, 1993, at 40.
72. Musa Comments on U.S. Air Strike on Baghdad, F.B.I.S. (NES-93-122), June 28, 1993,
at 13.
TERROR AND THE LAW
C. Unilateral as Opposed to Collective Security
Some foreign leaders indicated a concern with the United States's
assertion of a unilateral right to employ force. The Clinton adminis-
tration could have sought Security Council approval prior to the
bombing, rather than pursuing a unilateral action and then making
after-the-fact justifications for the action.7 For example, Canadian
Prime Minister Kim Campbell attempted to limit the precedential
value of the U.S. action by stating that the raid was "justifiable under
the context," but that the perceived need by the United States for a
unilateral response demonstrated the inability of the United Nations
to deal with the type of threat posed by Iraq's assassination at-
tempt.7' Prime Minister Campbell went on to argue that without
reforms, powerful nations would have an ability to employ unilateral
measures and then justify such measures afterwards.75 The French
newspaper Le Monde considered more expeditious reasons for
avoiding the Security Council, suggesting that the action was taken
without U.N. support because the connection to a failed assassination
attempt taking place two months earlier would not be convincing.76
One German columnist perceived a special place in international
law for unilateral action, holding such action to be as legitimate as
multilateral measures. Josef Joffe questioned the Security Council's
ability to examine objectively the threat from Iraq: "The five big shots
in the Security Council are not 'lay assessors' who unbiasedly weigh
justice against injustice and do so as unselfconsciously as the judicial
authorities. They are states that first and foremost pay tribute to..
[their] very own interests."'77
73. Using U.N. procedures before taking legally justified self-defense actions is not
compelled by article 51.
74. Campbelk U.S. Strike 'Justifable,' UN Needs Reform (Montreal Radio Canada
International, June 28, 1993), available in F.B.I.S. (WEU-93-125), July 1, 1993, at 13.
75. Id.
76. An Eye for an Eye, LE MONDE (Paris), June 29,1993, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S. (WEU-
93-123), June 29, 1993, at 26.
77. Josef Joffe, Does the 'Law of the Jungle' Prevail?, SUEDDEUTSCHE ZErrUNG (Munich),
June 29, 1993, at 4, translated in F.B.I.S. (WEU-93-124), June 30, 1993, at 1; accord Jacques
Jacquet-Francillon, Warning Shot, LE FIGARO, (Paris) June 28,1993, at 1, translated in F.B.I.S.
(WEU-93-123), June 29, 1993, at 25 ("it was high time that someone took the trouble of firing
a new warning shot to let Saddam Husayn[sic] and others know that state terrorism could not
go unpunished forever. If Washington had not made that decision, who would? The
Community in Brussels?").
19951
470 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 5:457
Perhaps the central reason for bypassing the Security Council was
the belief that the protection of a nation's past or present leaders is
an inherent element of sovereignty. Ultimately, the decision to
respond to a threat against a nation's leader must come from the
nation itself Had the United States approached the Security Council
with the request for action, and been refused, the Clinton administra-
tion would have been faced with the untenable choice between acting
unilaterally in the face of international opposition or acquiescing and
allowing Saddam Hussein to escape liability.' Seeking pre-strike
approval-in its essence, collective security-undermines the
argument that the protection of a nation's leaders is a unilateral right
of sovereignty. Beyond these issues and from a practical perspective,
proceeding to the Security Council first would have alerted the Iraqis
to the raid-thereby frustrating both the effectiveness and deterrence
aspects of the bombing.
D. State Practice with Regard to Assassinations
State-sponsored attacks on another state's leaders violates
international law. Professor William O'Brien of Georgetown
University asserts that "[the] general practice of belligerents... raises
a blanket moral presumption against assassinations."79 This moral
factor has been endorsed in numerous international and domestic
pronouncements. For example, the U.N. General Assembly explicitly
states that measures should be taken to prevent assassinations of
diplomatic personnel and to ensure prosecution of such crimes.8 0 In
1981, U.S. President Jimmy Carter signed an executive order
prohibiting assassinations by persons acting on behalf of the U.S.
government.1
Actions in response to assassination attempts are driven by the
specific geopolitical circumstances of the nations involved. For
example, South Korea responded to North Korea's 1983 attempt on
the life of South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan with great
78. It is conceivable that China would have vetoed an effort by the United States to seek
Security Council approval for forceful action against Iraq. Others may have been hesitant to
give approval as well because of the effort on the part of the Security Council to have Iraq grant
access to U.N. inspectors.
79. WmILAM V. O'BRiEN, LAW AND MORALTY IN IsRAEL's WAR Wrmh THE PLO 168
(1991).
80. The Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, G.A. Res. 3166, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp.
No. 30, UN Doc A/9030 (1973), 28 U.S.T. 1975.
81. Exec. Order No. 12,333, §2.11,3 C.F.R. 200 (1981), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
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restraint, reflecting the tenuous political climate between the two
countries. Although the bomb used in the attempt killed nineteen
people, including two close advisors to the President and four cabinet
ministers, South Korea refrained from directly responding.'
South Korea did openly blame the North for the attack.'
President Chun claimed that it was a "carefully premeditated plot" on
his life.' South Korea also made vague threats of reprisal against
North Korea.' However, and perhaps in response to U.S. admoni-
tions of restraint and fearing that retaliation would lead to a second
Korean war, South Korea did not respond with force.16
South Korea subsequently sought worldwide sanctions against
the North,' and sent a delegation to the United Nations to discuss
how to prevent further terrorist acts.88 Furthermore, in response to
the attack, Burma severed diplomatic relations with North Korea and
submitted a report to the United Nations one year later, implicating
North Korea in the bombing. 9
IV. THE LAW OF SELF DEFENSE
Put simply, self-defense exists where a state meets an unlawful
use of force with lawful force.' Theories of self-defense have
attempted to define the scope of the right to use force unilaterally.
This section presents both customary international law and U.N.
82. Clyde Haberman, Bomb Kills 19, Including 6 Key Koreans, N.Y. TrMEs, Oct. 10,1983,
at Al. President Chun escaped death only because he was delayed in traffic and did not reach
the Mausoleum until after the bomb exploded.
83. Inquiry by Seoul Blames North for Bombing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16,1993, at A4. After
an investigation, the Burmese authorities sentenced two North Korean army officers to death
for the incident North Korea has always denied its involvement in the bombing. Burma
Decrees Death for 2 North Koreans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1983, § 1, at 7.
84. Seoul Condemns Bombing as Plot by North Korea, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1983, at Al.
85. Id. at A12.
86. Bernard Gwertzman, U.S. Urges Seoul to Exercise Restraint on Killings, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 13, 1983, at As. The Reagan administration seemed to think that North Korea was
responsible. Id. The bombing followed a pattern of North Korean assassination attempts. In
January 1968, North Korean agents had been caught near the Blue House (the presidential
residence in Seoul) on an assassination mission. Id.
87. THE KOREA TIMEs (Seoul), Nov. 8,1993, at 1, reprinted in Worldwide Sanctions Sought
Against North, F.B.I.S. (South Korea), Nov. 8, 1983, at E4-5. Sanctions never materialized.
88. TONG-A ILBO (Seoul), Dec. 1, 1983, at 1, translated in Government to Seek U.N.
Support Against N. Korea, F.B.I.S. (South Korea), Dec. 1, 1983, at El.
89. YONHAP (Seoul), Oct. 3,1984, reprinted in Report Submitted on Rangoon Bombing to
UN, F.B.I.S. (Burma), Oct. 3, 1984, at G1.
90. See YORAM DINSTMiN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DMEENCE 165 (1988).
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doctrines of self-defense and analyzes their applicability with regard
to terrorism in general and the Baghdad raid in particular.
A. Customary International Law
The customary international law of self-defense derives from the
Caroline incident.9' As atthreshold matter, self-defense may be used
only against states that have breached international law. 2  The
Carolinie guidelines further require, "a necessity of self-defense,
instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment
for deliberation."'93 That is, the necessity of self-defense "presuppos-
es the absence of any alternative means of protection for certain
essential rights of the state which are endangered. '-4 The danger to
these essential rights must be both serious and imminent.95 Finally,
only "reasonable" actions may be taken in self-defense, restrained by
the necessity of protecting the state's essential rights and thus
proportional?6 to the danger at handy The essence of the custom-
ary law of self-defense is that it should be protective, not punitive in
character. It should thus not serve as a justification for the aggressive
use of force.98
91. The Caroline was a ship used by Canadian rebels in an insurrection against Britain in
1837. Although the United States maintained neutrality during the British-Canadian conflict,
it found its position compromised by the activities of the Canadian ship Caroline. The ship was
used to travel between rebel camps along the U.S.-Canadian border. The ship was destroyed
by British soldiers while on the New York side of the Niagara River. In a series of letters to
the British Governmeni, Secretary of State Daniel Webster articulated what became the
common law interpretation of self-defense. See INTERNATIONAL LAW 1221-22 (Barry Carter
& Phillip Trimble eds., Little, Brown and Company) (1991).
92. Professor Bowett explained, "The essence of self-defence is a wrong done, a breach of
a legal duty owed to the state acting in self-defence." D.W. BoWETr, SELF-DEFENCE IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw 9 (1958).
93. Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to British Ambassador Fox (Apr. 24,
1841), reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 91, at 1219.
94. BOWETr, supra note 92, at 269.
95. Id. The stipulation of immediacy has come under heavy criticism in the modem context
of terrorist violence. Since the victim states are often unsure of the identity of the attacker (or
whether the attackers were state-supported), they must have time to examine their potential
response. More so than in a clear, isolated, state-to-state border incident, political questions
emerge in countering a continuous terrorist threat. See e.g., Di NSEN, supra note 90, at 209-10.
96. Secretary Webster's concept of necessity implied a proportional response. He wrote
that "[t]he act justified by the necessity of self-defense, must be limited by that necessity, and
kept clearly within it." Letter from Secretary of State Daniel Webster to British Ambassador
Fox (Apr. 24, 1841), reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 91, at 1219.
97. See BOWETr, supra note 92, at 269.
98. See id.
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History manifests a concern about expanding the idea of self-
defense beyond the notion of a protective use of force. Professor Ian
Brownlie argues that defining self-defense punitively would be a step
backwards in the development of international law to a time when
nations could use force to enforce various legal rights. Before 1920
self-defense was synonymous with self-preservation, the right to use
force to redress wrongs.99 States could use force in self-defense for
a variety of reasons, not just in response to belligerent aggression."°
Self-preservation is distinguished from self-defense in that the
traditional claim of self-preservation was not premised upon a state
being the victim of a legal breach.' °' According to Brownlie, any
expansion of the definition of self-defense to include reactions other
than responses to armed aggression returns to the language of self-
preservation. Such a regression would be disastrous: "It can hardly
be possible to select particular parts of the old doctrines of necessity,
self-preservation, or intervention and attach them to a category of
self-defence which has evolved in the context of considerable changes
in the attitude of the law towards the use of force."' "ca In the period
of 1920-1929 the use of force as a legitimate instrument of foreign
policy faded."° Professor Brownlie states, "[I]n state practice both
before and after the Second World War, resort to force by virtue of
the right of self-defence... [was] almost without exception associated
with the idea of reaction against the use of force."'" 4
B. The Justification for the Baghdad Raid Under Customary
International Law
Contrary to accepted norms of customary international law, the
administration's legal rationale seems to include elements of punish-
ment as well as protection. Indeed, despite the customary internation-
al law norm that actions in self-defense rest on principles of protec-
99. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 42-45,
240 (1991).
100. Id. at 240.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 255; see also DwsNrTrI, supra note 90, at 172-73 (citing the Nicaragua decision,
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14,101
(June 27) (Merits), in which the International Court of Justice used the concept of an "armed
attack" to restrict the right of self-defense in customary international law).
103. BROWNLIE, supra note 99, at 251.
104. Id. at 255.
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tion rather than punishment, all actions in self-defense combine the
two.10
5
The Clinton administration's action was protective in that it was
aimed maintaining credibility in the face of a serious threat to U.S.
political independence and punitive because it came two months after
the assassination plan was aborted. It was both protective and
punitive in seeking to enforce a norm of international law."° In a
narrow sense, military action was not necessary to protect either the
United States or former President Bush from an immediate danger.
An expanded examination reveals the strike's plausible necessity.
First, protection of a nation's elected officials is an essential right
of sovereignty.' Second, the assassination attempt occurred in the
extended wake of a war with Iraq. Further, since the war's end, Iraq
had continually interfered with U.N. inspectors and threatened force
against its own population. Passivity on the part of the United States
would have merely encouraged Saddam Hussein to continue to test
the resolve of the international community, possibly through another
assassination attempt. In this atmosphere, searching for a peaceful
solution could have been perceived as pointless. There did not seem
to be any reasonable basis for negotiating a dispute concerning an
aggressor's threat to kill a former U.S. president.
The customary international law criterion of immediacy presented
a problem for the administration. This specific assassination attempt
had been aborted and no longer presented a threat. Professor Yoram
Dinstein, however, contends that a time lag between action and
reaction should not deprive a defensive use of force of its protective
character.'08 According to Dinstein, the "necessity" criterion is
sufficient for determining whether there exists a present danger to the
responding state significant enough to warrant the use of force.
Requiring an absolute need for immediacy limits the involvement of
the political branches. The U.S. raid, in fact, serves as an example of
the propriety of dispensing with the immediacy prong altogether when
contemplating responses to terrorism. Considering the initial doubts
105. See infra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
106. Assassination attempts contravene U.N. Charter provisions prohibiting the use of force,
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4, and mandating the peaceful settlement of disputes. Id. at art. 2, 3.
107. U.N. CHIRTER art. 2,14.
108. DmSTriN, supra note 90, at 209. In fact, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin stated that
the time lag between the attempted assassination and the U.S. response was due to the joint
FBI-CIA investigation. Pentagon Statements on the Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,1993,
at A12.
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about Iraqi culpability, the U.S. decision to delay it response in order
to conduct a thorough investigation was proper.'t a Whereas one
purpose of the "immediacy" provision is to deter an indeterminate use
of force, the investigative delay in this situation helped to ensure a
precise use of force.
One factor that weighs in favor of the Clinton administration's
self-defense. justification was the nature of the U.S. response to the
Iraqi aggression. The responding operation was proportionate to the
Iraqi threat and aimed at a target with a direct connection to the plot
against former President Bush."0 Furthermore, American goals
were also aimed at deterrence-to damage Iraq's ability to carry out
future acts of terrorism."'
However, the Clinton administration failed to specify the future
threats that were to be deterred by the raid. Merely asserting that the
attack was aimed at deterring future threats does not add credibility
to the U.S. position. Unspecified future threats do not constitute
"aggression" in the sense that a manifest assassination plot is
aggressive. Meeting indefinite future threats with force comes too
close to the line of a purely punitive use of force. Allowing military
actions against unspecified future threats encourages the unilateral use
of force and may potentially eradicate the need for multilateralism.
The administration, despite its concern for national security, should
have specified the additional threats which the raid meant to deter.
It is precisely the indefinite nature of future threats that necessitates
an objective international review of the responding state's evidence.
C. The U.N. Charter
The provisions of the U.N. Charter regulating the use of force
should be interpreted in light of the goals of the United Nations. One
central goal is to remove the need for states to use war as an
instrument of foreign policy by promoting the peaceful settlement of
disputes." The United Nations was originally envisioned as a
109. There are certain benefits to an "immediacy" prong. This incident manifests the ability
of the press to put pressure on a president to take action. The longer the time lag between the
provocation and the action, the greater the opportunity for public pressure to build,
notwithstanding legal considerations.
110. U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 6. General Colin Powell explained that the Intelligence
Headquarters was selected because "it [was] the closest thing related to the provocation." Raid
on Baghdad, Pentagon Statements on the Missile Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1993, § 1, at 12.
111. U.N. SCOR, supra note 54, at 6.
112. See generally U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
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means through which the community of nations would ensure
international security. Collective action was to replace unilateral
responses to aggression.
At the inception of the United Nations there was a widespread
feeling that these goals were achievable. The essential goal was to
give this global organization a virtual monopoly on the use of
force." After the experience of the two World Wars, a belief
existed that modern technology had made war so destructive that the
use of force had become an unrealistic policy option." 4  Conse-
quently, the creation of a collective security system that could deter
or suppress threats to the peace seemed not only desirable, but neces-
sary.
The United Nations provides a centralizing mechanism for the
application of international law." In particular, two provisions of
the U.N. Charter work in tandem to prohibit the aggressive use of
force and ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes. Article 2(3)
mandates the peaceful resolution of disputes, stating: "All Members
shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not
endangered.""' Article 2(4) provides: "All Members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."'
' 7
The absolute language of these two Charter provisions is
tempered by later provisions. For situations in which a state must
defend itself from aggressive action by other states, article 51
recognizes that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
113. O'BREN, supra note 79, at 88; see also U.N. CHARTER arL 43.
114. O'BRIEN, supra note 79, at 87-88.
115. BowErr, supra note 92, at 6. With a centralizing mechanism, states should not be able
to act as the sole judge and jury of their actions.
116. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 3.
117. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4. Specifically in regard to terrorism, the General Assembly
clarified member's obligations: "Every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating,
assisting or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State ... ." The
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Oct. 1970, G.A. Res. 2625,
U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, 123, U.N. Doc A/8028 (1971).
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has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace
and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of
this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security."'
Thus, article 51 explicitly recognizes and legitimizes the use of self-
defense as right of sovereign nations.
Article 51 contemplates two phases for reviewing the use of
force. At the first stage, a state decides for itself whether or not to
employ force. Ideally, this subjective decision is tempered by the
considered and disinterested judgement of the Security Council."9
However, Security Council consideration does not preclude the right
of a nation to use self-defense. Article 51 specifies the continuation
of self-defense rights "until the Security Council has taken the
measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."'
Interpreters disagree about the conditions in which a state can
make the initial determination to use self-defense. The debate centers
around two questions: (1) whether the concept of an "inherent" right
of self-defense is specifically limited by an "armed attack," and, (2)
if so, what constitutes an "armed attack"? The answers to these
questions determine whether the administration's self-defense theory
represents a departure from generally accepted interpretations of
article 51.
Professor D.W. Bowett provides an alternative to traditional
notions of self-defense under the Charter. He permits the Clinton
administration to avoid altogether the question of whether a failed
assassination plot constitutes an armed attack.' Under Bowett's
thesis, the administration may contend that assassination plots infringe
118. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
119. DINSTEIN, supra note 90, at 192-94.
120. U.N. CHARTER art. 51. The preservation of self-defense rights has an adverse effect
when a politically powerful nation can delay Security Council consideration of an issue in order
to undertake unilateral action according to that state's preserved self-defense rights.
121. Bowett's argument that violations of a nation's political independence may trigger a
response in force could potentially grant a legal basis to uses of force in response to non-forcible
provocations (e.g. economic embargoes may be said to violate a nation's political independence).
A common sense solution would limit forcible self-defense to those situations in which a violent
breach of international law occurs. See Bowett, supra note 92, at 130, 43,45, 92.
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upon essential rights. Once such rights are violated, the victim state
may respond in force, consistent with international law."
Bowett maneuvers around the definition of armed attack by
advocating an expansive view of the self-defense right. He considers
the article 51 provision for the inherent right of self-defense to
implicate general international law," thereby overriding the article
51 limitation of an armed attack."z Professor Bowett's interpreta-
tion of article 2(4) does not restrict the customary right of self-
defense. This reading is particularly significant because, according to
Bowett, the customary right of self-defense is not limited by an armed
attack."z Accordingly, states are permitted to respond in force to
other forms of aggression besides an armed attack.'1
Bowett maintains that article 51's focus on aggression in a
territorial sense obscures alternative forms of aggression that trigger
the right to self-defense. Other interests of states, at least one of
which is specified in article 2(4) (the right to political indepen-
dence),1z' are as significant as territorial integrity." In the ab-
sence of the peremptory requirement of an armed attack, self-defense
is only limited by traditional criteria. The violation of international
law provoking a response must be of the same character as an armed
attack. 29
Other commentators disagree with Bowett's interpretation of
article 51. Professors Dinstein and Brownlie contend that article 51
uses the armed attack requirement to restrict the right of self-defense,
although they differ about what constitutes an "armed attack." Their
argument, to the extent f its agreement, rests on the drafters' intent
to restrict the use of force. Professor Brownlie considers article 2(4)
122. Id.
123. See also Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FoREIGN AFF. 901,919 (1986)
(contending that article 51's "inherent" right is an affirmation of customary international law).
124. BoWETr, supra note 92, at 184-85. Under this construct, members have those rights
under general international law except for those rights which they have specifically given up
under the Charter.
125. Id. at 188. However, Professor Brownlie contends that by 1945, customary international
war allowed use of force only in response to force and thus implicitly limited the use of force
to responses to "armed attack." See BROwNLiE, supra note 99, at 274.
126. BowETr, supra note 92, at 192.
127. Bowett defines political independence as the right to conduct foreign relations. Id. at
43, 45. Attempting.to murder a president because of actions he took while in office certainly
violates this right.
128. Id. at 30.
129. For instance, self-defense in protection of political independence depends upon the
breach of the duty of non-intervention. Id. at 51.
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a wide-sweeping prohibition on the use of force and thus, in his view
any exceptions would be narrow.' Dinstein argues that any
provision for using force under the guise of self-defense should be
limited by the plain language of the Charter." Thus in the view of
both professors, for the U.S. action against Baghdad to have been
valid, the Iraqi assassination attempt must have constituted an armed
attack.
Under the Dinstein and Brownlie analyses, the assassination plot,
though aborted, could constitute an armed attack. The importance of
the Iraqi assassination plot lay in its conception and initiation, not in
its final execution. It is not required that an article 51 attack be a
large scale military action.m As Professor Dinstein stated, "It
would be absurd to require that the defending State should sustain
and absorb a devastating... blow, only to prove an immaculate
conception of self-defense."' 33 Consequently, when the suspects set
off with their bomb-laden land-cruiser, Iraq can be said to have
launched an armed attack against the United States.
Furthermore, others have indicated that terrorist incidents of
"sufficient gravity" may be classified as armed attacks.' The Case
Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against
Nicaragua provides support for this view. In 1986 the ICJ held that
dispatching armed bands into another state for a particularly
"grave'' use of force of "scale and effects" constituted an armed
attack.'36 Similarly, sending a bomb into Kuwait in order to attempt
the assassination of a former president of a country is sufficiently
"grave" and of appropriate "scale and effects" to qualify under the
ICJ's requirements.
It is not necessary that the aggressor state cross the defending
state's borders for a terrorist attack to qualify as an armed attack. In
considering the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran, the ICJ likened the takeover of the U.S.
130. BROWNLIE, supra note 99, at 424.
131. DINSTE N, supra note 90, at 174-75.
132. Id. at 181.
133. Id. at 179.
134. See Vernon Cassin et al., The Definition of Aggression, 16 HARV. INT'L LJ. 589,607-08
(1975).
135. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 14, 101 (June 27) (Merits).
136. Id. at 103.
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Embassy and its staff to an "armed attack."' A strong analogy
exists between the role of a former president as an emissary of the
United States and the role of an embassy. A U.S. embassy is the
official representative of the United States on foreign soil. A former
president serves a similar purpose in both representing the United
States and pursuing diplomatic relations. In this light, attempting to
attack former President Bush on a state visit to Kuwait may be
conceptualized as an attack on the United States.
Professor Brownlie, representing the traditional interpretation of
article 51, does not support an expansion of the definition of armed
attack to terrorist attacks. He fears expanding the permissible use of
force under article 51 to such a degree that article 2(4) becomes
meaningless.' Browniie limits the definition of armed attack to
situations where "there is a control by the principal, the aggressor
state, and an actual use of force by its agents., 139 Thus, Brownlie
characterizes armed attacks as trespasses or invasions,' 40 not as
terrorist incidents. Applied to the Baghdad situation, an assassination
attempt against a former president wold not rise to the level of an
armed attack. Furthermore, the abortion of the assassination
mitigates against classifying this incident as an armed attack.
Professor Brownlie contends that, "[it] is a rare instance in which a
use of force may be justified although no actual attack has oc-
curred.'14
1
Therefore, the traditional interpretation of article 51 leads to the
conclusion that an unsuccessful assassination attempt on a former U.S.
president which took place outside of the United States would not be
an armed attack. The question remains whether new conditions,
unforeseen by the U.N. Charter's drafters, suggest a limited expansion
of the armed attack provision in article 51.
D. Terrorism'sEffect on the Definition of Armed Attack Under
Article 51
Qualifying only those attacks that involve a cross-border
transgression as armed attacks manifests an anachronistic conception
137. United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.CJ. 3,29,
42 (May 24) (Merits).
138. BROWNUE, supra note 99, at 274.
139. Id. at 373.
140. See id
141. Id. at 374. Professor Brownlie offers as an example of a "rare instance" the downing
of a bomber thought to be carrying nuclear weapons.
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of aggression. Because the U.N. Charter is based upon the state
system, traditional forms of state-to-state violence were the drafters'
major concerns. 42 The Charter did not comprehend the forms of
violence which characterize modem terrorism. As new forms of
aggression manifest themselves, the conception of appropriate
defenses against such behavior must be expanded. Former Secretary
of State Frank B. Kellogg long ago noted the dangers of strict rules
of self-defense in an international environment marked by flux.
Kellogg stated: "[I]t is not in the interest of peace that a treaty should
stipulate a juristic conception of self-defense since it is far too easy for
the unscrupulous to mold events to accord with an agreed defini-
tion."'43 Thus, adherence to doctrinal formality serves the interests
of the lawless, not the lawful.
Since international law generally reflects states' consensus on
legal principles,' the pertinent question is whether states consider
terrorism the equivalent of traditional forms of aggression.'45 When
reacting to the Baghdad raid, many states mentioned the importance
of fighting terrorism. 4 6 Thus, a large segment of the international
community seems willing to entertain an expanded definition of
"armed attack" which includes state sponsored terrorism targeting
national leaders.
Including serious terrorist attacks within the ambit of the armed
attack provision serves the interest of stability. Defensive actions
against headquarters, facilities, and the terrorists themselves will
possibly deter further terrorism by creating an unacceptable cost to
aggressors.147 Terrorist attacks reflect the post World War II trend
toward replacing traditional engagement in war with low-level
142. Perhaps the most significant reason for the Charter's restrictions on the permissible use
of force was the fear of escalating violence in a nuclear age. Professor Brownlie argued against
allowing a wide breadth to use force to protect certain sovereign rights because of the nuclear
capability of many states. BROWNLIE, supra note 99, at 436.
143. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg, Address to the American Society of International
Law (Apr. 28, 1928), quoted in BROWNLEE, supra note 99, at 236.
144. O'BREEN, supra note 79, at 82.
145. Former Secretary of State George Schultz saw the law not as an obstacle but as an aid
against the arbitrary use of force that marks terrorism: "The UN Charter is not a suicide pact.
The law is a weapon on our side, and it is up to us to use it to its maximum extent." Thus, "a
nation attacked by terrorists is permitted to use force to prevent or preempt future attacks. ... "
George Schultz, Low Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, 86 DEPIT ST. BULL. Mar.,
1986, at 15, 17.
146. See supra notes 66-69 and acompanying text.
147. O'BRIEN, supra note 79, at 22.
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conflicts.' 4 Stability may best be preserved by expanding the self-
defense right to proportional responses to low level aggressive force,
rather than limiting acceptable defensive use of force to situations of
large scale assaults.
Limits on a new standard of self-defense will best be set by
nations that encourage an effective international review of self-
defense claims.149  Unfortunately, the recent past leaves very little
indication that the Security Council is up to this task.'u
E. The Role of the Security Council as a Reviewing Body
The Security Council's reviewing role is essential to keeping
actions taken in self-defense defensive in nature as opposed to aggres-
sive.' Because "no one state can arrogate to itself the final right
to determine unilaterally the question whether another state is in
breach of established duties,"'" a right of self-defense without
review by the United Nations defeats the fundamental basis of the
Charter.53 An international organ must decide whether a "threat to
the protecting state's rights exists."' 4 If the Security Council is not
effective, individual members will step into the vacuum and determine
for themselves when to use force. 55
However, the role of the Security Council is not that of a court.
It is a political body156 which deliberates about international political
148. During the years 1964-1993, the PLO-Israeli conflict was an unending series of terrorist
and other attacks and Israeli responses. In this environment it was difficult to say what
constituted a particular "armed attack." Realistically, a continuing state of low-level war may
be a substitute for an "armed attack." Id. at 2. The important goal in any system is stability,
which may be best achieved through proportional responses to attacks-not by passive defense.
Id.
149. Notwithstanding political considerations, by not seeking Security Council approval for
the Baghdad strike, even after the event, the Clinton administration missed an opportunity to
further the development of self-defense law.
150. Witness the problems encountered by the Council in regard to Bosnia, Somalia, and
Haiti. See generally President Bill Clinton Addresses the General Assembly of the United Nations,
Federal News Service, White House Briefing, Sept. 27,1993, available in LEXIS, NEWS Library,
CURNWS File.
151. The International Military Tribunal at Ntlmberg noted: "[W]hether action taken under
the claim of self-defense was in fact aggressive or defensive must ultimately be subject to
investigation and adjudication if international law is ever to be enforced." Cited in BROWNLEE,
supra note 99, at 239.
152. BowETr, supra note 92, at 262.
153. Id. at 273.
154. Id. at 260.
155. Georg Schwarzenberger, The Fundamental Principles of International Law, 87 Recueil
des Cours d'Academie de Droit International [R.C.A.D.I] 195, 338 (1955).
156. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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events involving aggression. Although the Security Counsel is now
undergoing a period of introspection and revision,"s its actions since
inception indicate an inability to serve as an objective body for
review.
When considering the use of force through terrorism, the Security
Council was unwilling to counter those states whose notions of
"justice" excused violence, 5' even though the Western world, upon
whose ideals the Charter was based, claimed that aggressive force
could not be justified for any reason."' For example, Chinese
Ambassador Chuang stated: "[T]he violence used by the aggressors
and oppressors is unjust, while the violence used by the victims of
aggression and the oppressed to resist aggression and win liberation
is just."" At the same time, the Council was quite prepared,
however, to condemn those who took belligerent counteractions
against terrorism."'
F The Bombing of Libya in 1986
The 1986 U.S. military action against Libya is the paradigmatic
response of the state to terrorism and an excellent example of what
an expanded conception of article 51 would allow. In regard to the
Baghdad raid, the bombing of Tripoli reveals a continuity in U.S.
thinking about confronting criminal states. Most noteworthy, though,
is the generally favorable international reaction to the 1993 Baghdad
raid, a factor absent from the atmosphere surrounding President
Reagan's attack on Libya seven years earlier.'
62
The United States bombed Libya because of its continuous
sponsorship of terrorist attacks."' The immediate impetus for the
157. See supra note 151.
158. See William O'Brien, Reprisals, Deterrence and Self-Defense in Counterterror Operations,
30 VA. J. INT'L L. 421, 472-73 (1990) (describing the Third World and Communist support for
PLO guerilla activities).
159. See id at 478.
160. U.N. SCOR, 29th Sess., 1769th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1769 (1974).
161. See generally O'BRMN, supra note 79 (describing the Council's consistent practice of
comdemning Israeli counterterror actions while ignoring Arab terrorism).
162. The Cuban ambassador compared the Reagan administration to the "Hitler Clique,"
an outburst that led the French ambassador to publicly rebuke Cuba's representative. See U.N.
SCOR, 41st Sess., 2675th mtg. at 38, U.N. Doe. S/PV.2675 (1986) and 2676th mtg. at 4, U.N.
Doe. S/PV.2676 (1986). The General Assembly condemned the attack in Cold War terms,
regretting the "disinformation campaigns" carried out against Libya. G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N.
GAOR, 41st Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 34, U.N. Doc. A/41/51 (1986).
163. Military targets in Libya were bombed. Such targets included air fields and barracks
at Tripoli and Benghazi. Gregory F. Intoccia, American Bombing of Libya: An International
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U.S. action was an explosion at the LaBelle disco in Berlin164 and
a threatened attack in Paris."e U.S. intelligence sources alleged that
Libya, under the leadership of Colonel Muammar el-Qaddafi, had
been involved in these attacks, as well as at least thirty others.' 6
The Reagan administration had cautioned Qaddafi, who responded
with the disco bombing. The United States felt the necessity to
respond, in order to maintain a credible deterrence capability.167
During the ensuing Security Council debate, the United States
argued that Libya's acts of terrorism, as a violation of article 2(4)'s
prohibition on the use of force, precluded the country from claiming
immunity from a defensive response. The United States argued that
its action was an inherently defensive and forceful response under
article 51. In support of this position, United States Ambassador to
the United Nations, Vernon Walters linked Qaddafi's threats to attack
the United States with evidence of past and future terrorist attacks by
Libya in order to establish that Libya's actions were a violation of
article 2(4)."6 Proving that Qaddafi had a plan of terrorism was
crucial, because it lent credence to the view that the U.S. action was
motivated by deterrence.
The legal arguments supporting the U.S. position were best
expressed by the British Representative to the United Nations, Sir
John Thomson. 69 Thomson contended that self-defense includes
the right to weaken an opponent.'70 Stating that "state-directed
terrorism is in fact war by another name,"17' he supported the U.S.
contention that the action against Libya was part of a continuing
Legal Analysis, 19 CASE W. RES J. INT'L L. 177, 179 (1987).
164. The LaBelle Disco bombing killed 2 U.S. servicemen and wounded 229 persons,
including 78 Americans. O'BRIEN, supra note 79, at 114.
165. SOFAER, supra note 123, at 921. Chancellor Kohl reported to the Bundestag that Libya
was responsible for the LaBelle bombing. See BRIAN DAVIS, QADDAFI, TERRORISM, AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE U.S. ATTACK ON LIBYA 116 (1990).
166. SOFAER, supra note 123, at 921. Prior to the bombing, Libya was suspected of
masterminding a plot to kidnap a U.S. ambassador in Africa. An April 6, 1986 explosion near
the U.S. embassy in Beirut was thought to implicate Libya as well. See DAVIS, supra note 165,
at 121.
167. DAVIS, supra note 165, at 122. The raid was not an attempt to kill Qaddafi, however
desirable that may have been to the Reagan administration. The U.S. forces simply did not have
the ordnance sufficient to kill Qaddafi in his bunker at Bab al-Aziziyya. Id.
168. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2764th mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2764 (1986).
169. Public supporters of the U.S. action included Great Britain, Israel, Dominica, St. Lucia,
Grenada, Honduras, Chad, South Africa, Singapore, Canada, and maybe Australia. DAVIS,
supra note 165, at 146.
170. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2679th mtg. at 27, U.N. Doc. SIPV.2679 (1986).
171. Id. at 18.
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conflict. Therefore, given the probability or perceived probability of
continuing terrorism, the action of the United States was a justified
method of deterring future terrorism. Evidence of continuing attacks
itself gave the Reagan administration the right of self-defense under
article 51. As stated by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher:
"[W]e [Great Britain] would support action directed against specific
Libyan targets demonstrably involved in the conduct and support of
terrorist activities."'"
With the exception of Great Britain, the international reaction to
the 1986 bombing was largely negative.'73 Thailand claimed that
such reprisals were not "valid substitute[s]" for multilateralism.' 4
Yemen also criticized the United States for bypassing the United
Nations, noting that the United.States, as a superpower, had a special
responsibility for promoting world peace.'75 Other states recognized
the need to stop terrorism but disagreed with the means. Based on
a perceived case of disproportionality, Denmark "deeply deplore[d]"
the action taken by the United States.76
In general, European reaction was difficult to gauge because of
widespread concerns about future terrorism. Some U.S. officials
believed that the Europeans strongly supported the U.S. action, but
in private. As one U.S. State Department official characterized
Europe's concerns, "A lot of them are worried that if they support
the U.S. in public, they will get a grenade up their kazoos."'
German Chancellor Helmut Kohl exemplified the European predica-
ment of wanting to support counterterror measures, but not in terms
that would increase the likelihood of terror striking Europe.
Although Kohl publicly stated that he disagreed with the U.S.
response, he also criticized Libyan terrorism: "Whoever continually
preaches and practices violence, as Qaddafi does, must count on the
victims defending themselves."' 78 Spain saw Libya's threats as
172. Id. at 28.
173. Great Britain's reaction marked a change in attitude towards reprisals. Three months
before the raid, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher claimed that retaliatory or preemptive
strikes for purposes of punishing or preventing terrorism were "against international law" and
would result in "a much greater chaos." Karen DeYoung, Thatcher Reprisal Strikes Illegal,
WASH. PosT, Jan. 11, 1986, at Al.
174. See U.N. SCOR, 41st. Sess., 2682nd mtg. at 41, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2682 (1986).
175. U.N. SCOR, 41st Sess., 2675th mtg. at 44-45, U.N. Doc. S/PV2675 (1986).
176. U.N. SCOR, supra note 174, at 32.
177. See DAVIS, supra note 165, at 146.
178. See ki at 152-53.
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"intolerable and inadmissible," 179 but disagreed with the U.S.
response. France remained ambivalent, neither condoning nor
disapproving of the action."sc
In considering the generally favorable reaction to the Baghdad
raid, it is clear that the international community has become more
accepting of forceful responses to state-sponsored terrorism, at least
if the terrorist act is targeted against a nation's former leader. This
may mean that the international community accepts an expanded
definition of self-defense. It almost makes more favorable the
international reaction to reprisals, which the next section considers in
detail.
V. THE LAW OF REPRISALS
The law of reprisals presents an alternative to, and expansion of,
traditional self-defense theory'' Reprisals are "countermeasures
that would be illegal if not for a prior illegal act of the state against
which they are directed."'"
The U.N. Charter generally prohibits armed reprisals."83 The
illegality of reprisals also finds support in customary international law;
in fact, the view that reprisals are illegal has been supported as have
few other notions in international law." International aversion to
179. See id. at 152.
180. See id. at 154.
181. According to customary international law, reprisals are legal under certain conditions.
The customary law of reprisals was defined in the Naulilaa case of 1928. See Sir Humphrey
Waldock, The Regulation of the Use of Force by Individual States in International Law, 81
RECUEIL DES CouRs 455,458-460 (1952 vol. II), reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 91,
at 1223-24. Defined by the tribunal in Naulilaa, reprisals are: "[A]cts in retaliation for acts
contrary to international law on the part of the offending State, which have remained
unredressed after a demand for amends." Id. Reprisals, to be legal, must be based upon a prior
violation of international law. Legal reprisals, as explained by Naulilaa, could be preventative
and punitive measures, serving as incentives for the offending state to follow the law in the
future. Naulilaa, reprinted in Carter & Trimble, supra note 91, at 1224.
The criteria for legal reprisals under customary international law mirrors those of self-
defense. Reprisals must be necessary--the violated state needs first to look for peaceful
solutions. There must be some element of immediacy to the response, as it is impermissible to
retaliate for an event in the remote past. Lastly, the offended state must also seek a
proportionality between its counterforce and the force used in provocation. Id.
182. Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, 178 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 168
(1982).
183. BROWNLIE, supra note 99, at 265.
184. D.W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1972);
see also BROWNuE, supra note 99, at 223 ("Unambiguous prohibition of forcible reprisals was
finally accomplished by the Charter of the United Nations"). The prohibition on belligerent
reprisal tactics has been reiterated by the General Assembly--"States have a duty to refrain
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recognizing the legality of reprisals stem from two concerns. First, the
allegedly punitive nature of armed reprisals comports neither with the
Charter's provision for the peaceful settlement of disputes,' 8S nor
with its prohibition on the use of force." Second, harm to interna-
tional stability in addition to physical harm has already been
committed by the initial provocation (recognized as illegal under
international law).'' These concerns entail a narrow conceptualiza-
tion of the use of force that looks at each illegal provocation as a
discrete act.
Several commentators, have proposed various theories of
reasonable reprisals,'" and argued for recognition of their validity
under international law.'" From these various theories a general
doctrine of reasonable reprisals emerges. A reasonable reprisal can
be characterized as a deterrent action against a violent breach of
international law in the context of a continuing conflict. In many
respects, the Clinton administration's legal rationale followed the
theory of reasonable reprisals. Administration officials spoke of a
continuing threat from Iraq and of a belief that the bombing would
serve as a deterrent to these threats.'" Furthermore, the U.S. raid
may be viewed as part of a continuing conflict with Iraq, a direct
result of the Gulf War. The following sections will attempt to
distinguish reprisal theory from traditional self-defense theory, analyze
the system of reasonable reprisals in practice, establish methods for
limiting the use of force in reprisal, and analyze the Baghdad raid as
a defensive reprisal action.
A. Distinguishing Reprisals from Actions Taken in Self-Defense
Reprisals, undertaken by the victim state after an attack, are
allegedly punitive. They seek to force the target state to follow the
law in the future. Traditionally, actions taken in self-defense,
undertaken by the victim state while it is under attack, serve to
protect essential rights such as territorial integrity.'9 ' Reprisals and
from acts of reprisal involving the use of force." The Declaration on Principles of International
Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States, supra note 117.
185. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, A 3.
186. U.N. CHARTER art 2, 1 4; see also BowETr, supra note 92, at 13.
187. DINSTMN, supra note 90, at 207.
188. See infra notes 217-26 and accompanying text.
189. The terms "reasonable" and "defensive" reprisal will be used interchangeably.
190. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
191. Bowett would add political independence. Bow=rr, supra note 92, at 3.
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actions taken in self-defense are both means of unilateral action, 92
However, reprisals have historically been categorized as punitive and
consequently, illegal, whereas actions taken in self-defense have
historically been considered protective in nature and therefore, legal.
The distinction between actions taken in self-defense and
reprisals fits into an international scheme in which punishment is a
matter for society as a whole and defense is a matter for the
individual state."9 However, modem instances of low-level, contin-
uing violence disrupt this distinction. The same military operation
may complete several functions at one time: deterrence, prevention,
and retaliation."9 There is no way to draw the line between punish-
ment and deterrence, because the latter results from the former. As
Professor Bowett states:
[T]he dividing line between protection and retribution becomes
more and more obscure as one moves away from the particular
incident and examines the whole context in which the two or more
acts of violence have occurred. Indeed, within the whole context
of a continuing state of antagonism between states, with recurring
acts of violence, an act of reprisal may be regarded as being at the
same time both a form of punishment and the best form of
protection for the future, since it may act as a deterrent against
future acts of violence by the other party.'15
Thus, whether a unilateral action will be judged with regard to a
particular incident or in the context of a continuing conflict will often
determine its legality."
The contextual "accumulation of events" doctrine,"9 which
considers the reprisal activity in relation to the prior actions that
provoked a response, is based upon a more realistic view of the
modem use of force within a continuing conflict. This doctrine affects
the "necessity" prong of the customary law of self-defense. According
to one commentator, the advent of terrorism has expanded the
192. Id.
193. Id.; see also R. Barsotti, Armed Reprisals, in THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF
THE USE OF FORCE 82 and n.17 (A. Cassese ed., 1986) (noting that any notion of reasonable
reprisals brings reprisals within the U.N. system and serves as an admission that the current
system of collective security does not function).
194. O'BRiEN, supra note 79, at 21.
195. Bowett, supra note 184, at 3.
196. I. at 4.
197. See DINSTrEIN, supra note 90, at 189.
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meaning of necessity.9 "Proportionality" is impacted as well.
What are in fact responsive, protective actions may seem dispropor-
tionate with regard to the immediate provocation for which the victim
state responds. In the context of a larger conflict, the actions may be
appropriate.' 99
B. The Security Council and Reprisals
The Security Council historically has denied the validity of
contextual analysis,' thereby ignoring the difficulties that many
states face. One commentator stated: "[A] legal system which merely
prohibits the use of force and does not make adequate provision for
the peaceful settlement of disputes invites failure."'" Examining an
incident in isolation facilitates an easy judgement by the Security
Council;' the Council does not have to engage in value based
judgments concerning the totality of the conflict. However, the
Council ends up characterizing as illegal reprisals those acts which,
notwithstanding traditional self-defense theory, may in fact be
legitimate protective measures. 3  In modem times, terrorist activity
gains an advantage if guerrillas can hit and strike against a state
whose legal options are generally limited to self-defense within its
borders. The Council's past insistence on analyzing reprisal
actions case-by-case thus has restricted the legal options of countries
seeking to defend themselves based upon intelligence information and
the historical similarities of threats.' The Council's reputation
consequently suffers and its actions are perceived as unfair by the
victim state.06
198. In reference to the changed circumstances since Caroline, Professor O'Brien stated:
"Given the duration and magnitude of Israel's war with the PLO ... the interpretation of
necessity is very different from that in a singular incident along the U.S.-Canadian border in
1837." O'Brien, supra note 158, at 471.
199. Bowett, supra note 184, at 6.
200. But see note 66 and accompanying text.
201. Waldock, supra note 181, at 456.
202. Bowett, supra note 184, at 9.
203. Id.
204. Id
205. O'BRIEN, supra note 79, at 103.
206. See generally id.; see also O'Brien, supra note 158. Israel has repeatedly criticized the
Council for ineffectively dealing with terrorism while ignoring the legal basis of Israeli
counterterror actions. The Council effectively lost any persuasive power it may have had on
successive Israeli governments. Consequently, the extent to which the Council may have
influenced the Israeli defensive regime diminished. Since the Council was unable to impose
punishment on Israel (see Bowett, supra note 184, at 25) its effectiveness was limited to the role
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According to Professor O'Brien, the Security Council is applying
the prohibition on reprisals in a situation unforeseen by the Charter's
drafters: "The systemic model reflected in the Security Council's
handling of 'reprisals' is a pristine 1945 U.N. Charter model"'
which supposes that collective security will work. Realistically,
however, if the Security Council does not take effective action against
provocations to which states feel the necessity to respond, collective
security will fail.
Perhaps the most publicized example of the Security Council's
consideration of reprisal actions concerned Israeli responses to
fedayeen border transgressions. Israel has advanced the view
that her situation must be viewed in the context of a series of
continuing confrontations.21 The Security Council has not consistent-
ly denounced the Israeli responses as illegal.2 ' The Council has not
articulated a theory of why Israeli actions are not legal as means of
self-defense but are instead illegal reprisal actions.212  At times, the
body has labeled Israeli action disproportionate and unprovoked, an
unnecessary action if reprisals were considered illegal anyway.
Professor Bowett concluded that in the Arab-Israeli conflict "a
proportionate reprisal will not incur condemnation., 21 4
of a public critic, a testament to the Council's impotence in regard to Arab terrorism and Israeli
reactions thereto.
207. O'BRIEN, supra note 79, at 118.
208. Fedayeen is a well known term used to describe Arab guerilla activity against Israel.
209. The Israeli-PLO/Arab confrontation, differing from the Iraqi-American conflict in its
longevity and frequency of belligerent actions, represents only one form of reprisal action taking
place in a continuing conflict. It does not close the field.
210. Around the time of Bowett's article (1972), the Israeli justification for responding to
attacks began to move away from punishment for prior acts to deterrence in a condition of
continuing conflict. Bowett, supra note 184, at 10.
211. Nor have major powers on the Security Council been averse to term some "reprisal"
actions defensive. When the British were involved in Yemen their U.N. Representative stated:
"[I]t is clear that the use or armed force to repel or prevent an attack-that is, legitimate action
of a defensive nature-may sometimes have to take the form of a counter-attack." U.N. SCOR,
19th Sess., 1109th mtg. at 5, U.N. Doe. S/PV.1109 (1964).
212. Bowett, supra note 184, at 7.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 12. Condemnations seemed to follow allegedly disproportionate action by Israel.
Id. at 11. Even with condemnations, the Security Council has proved ineffective in halting
reprisals. The expectation that reprisals will meet with no more than a formal condemnation
does little to prevent them. Id. at 10.
TERROR AND THE LAW
C. A System of Reasonable Reprisals
A system of reasonable reprisals more closely matches modem
state practice than does the traditional model of self-defense.
Defensive reprisal actions are limited by guidelines of reasonableness.
Ideally, these guidelines are taken into account by an international
reviewing body cognizant of the factual circumstances at issue.215
The argument for a "reasonable" standard to judge reprisals
moves the focus of the reprisal controversy from a peremptory legal
norm absolutely forbidding reprisals to a policy judgement. Although
the Security Council has operated publicly under the belief that the
use of force in response to violence breeds a cycle of violence,216 the
requirements for a legal reprisal could be tailored so as to limit the
use of this doctrine. Professor Bowett derives three217 requirements
in order for a reprisal to be considered reasonable by the Security
Council: First, has the state conducting the reprisal provoked the
delictual activity by the target state?" Second, does the reprisal
hurt chances of a peaceful settlement of the dispute?219 Third, what
actions has a state taken to limit the need for reprisals?' When a
state has not provoked delictual activity, nor hurt chances for peace,
nor looked for force as a first resort, the Security Council has, at
times, refrained from denouncing the state's actions as illegal
reprisals. '
Professor Dinstein takes a more liberal, and perhaps more
pragmatic, approach. He dispenses with the formalities of labeling
actions "reprisals" or "self-defense," maintaining that article 51 allows
215. Id. at 32.
216. Id. at 16.
217. Bowett would like to add another condition-specifically, why did self-defense theory
not provide adequate protection for the responding state? Id. at 27-28. The self-defense issues
in this case concern Caroline's "immediacy" provision and article 51's "armed attack" stipulation.
The administration's legal rationale becomes easier to justify in reprisal theory because the
requirement of immediate action is relaxed. The "armed attack" issue, concerning the
provocation of a defensive action, remains equally controversial in reprisal theory.
218. Id. at 15. The United States did not provoke Iraq's delictual activity since prior political
and military actions against Iraq were sanctioned by the United Nations. See S.C. Res. 678,
U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2963rd mtg. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
219. See Bowett, supra note 184, at 9. Underlying this question is the assumptions that the
parties want a peaceful solution to their conflict and that such a solution is achievable. That
does not seem to be the case in the U.SAraq conflict.
220. Id. at 20. This requirement, concerning the territorial defensive regime in the victim
state, does not apply to an assassination attempt overseas.
221. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
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defensive force, whether in reprisal or self-defense.' 2  Defensive
armed reprisals are "post attack measures of self-defense short of
war.' '2 To be defensive, the deterrent nature of a reprisal action
must be "future-oriented," in other words, those undertaking reprisal
must expect that action provoking the reprisal will happen again.'
The Baghdad raid may be best characterized as a reprisal because it
sought to compel future Iraqi compliance with international law.
Both Dinstein and Bowett emphasize "proportionality"' as the
major factor in determining the legality of reprisals. The proportion-
ality requirement presents a particular difficulty for advocates of
defensive reprisals because of its opportunity for abuse. Those who
assert the legality of reprisals must lay down criteria to prevent the
use of reprisals as a cover for aggressive action. Professor Bowett sets
forth four criteria for judging the proportionality of reprisal actions:
(1) force should not be used in order to enforce minor rights; (2)
force should be used in the most humanistic way possible, thereby
limiting collateral damage; (3) the use of force should not escalate the
situation into a war; and, (4) the force used should be limited to
obtaining redress for the wrong done.P
Arguably, the U.S. raid was, if anything, disproportionately
tolerant compared with Iraq's provocation. The target chosen-Iraqi
intelligence headquarters-was implicated in the threat on former
President Bush's life.' Furthermore, the prospect of another
assassination attempt would have likely originated from the
Mukhabarat. By bombing this specific target, the United States may
be said to have gained redress for an Iraqi breach of international
law. The extent of the force used in this incident was minimal and
the timing was at night in order to reduce deaths.' Most impor-
tantly, the threat from Iraq involved an essential right of sovereignty:
222. Professor Schachter as well holds "punitive" uses of force impermissible while
"defensive retaliation" is not. Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82
MICH. L. REv. 1620, 1638 (1984). See also DINSTEIN, supra note 90, at 207-08 (asserting that
the use of protective force, even after an attack (e.g. in reprisal) is permitted under article 51).
223. DiNsTEIN, supra note 90, at 209.
224. R.W. Tucker, Reprisals & Self-Defense: The Customary Law, 66 AM. J. INT'L L 586,
591 (1972); see also DiNSTEmN, supra note 90, at 208 (contending that the goal of defensive
reprisals is deterrence, plain and simple. Professor Dinstein stated: "[P]laying with fire
constitutes a dangerous game and is what most armed reprisals are about.").
225. Dinstein defines proportionality as the "approximation in 'scale and effects' between
unlawful force and lawful counterforce." DINSTEIN, supra note 90, at 216.
226. See Bowett, supra note 184, at 7, 11.
227. See supra note 110.
228. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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a nation's right to conduct a political life without the life of its leaders
being threatened.
However, by including indefinite future threats in the legal basis
for its self-defense claim, the Clinton administration invited allega-
tions that its military response was too weak. 29 If the goal of the
attack was to limit Iraq's capability to facilitate terrorism, the attack
should have been much harsher. Columnist William Saire favored
using air power to set Iraq's war machine back a couple of years while
demonstrating to terrorists that the United States would respond
powerfully against them.z
The difficulty with Safire's view is that it seeks to open up a
virtual state of war under the cover of responding to a violation of
international law. That would set a precedent of instability rather
than a limited goal of continuing deterrence against threats of
assassination. Proportionality demands that a reprisal have a
sufficient nexus to the delictual conduct of the aggressor state. Legal
considerations are different from policy choices, however desirable or
workable those choices may appear.
Evaluating facts and standards necessitates the existence of an
international body to review claims that reprisals are in fact defensive.
A truly effective Security Council review may serve as a deterrent to
aggressive behavior masquerading as a reasonable reprisal."' In this
regard it is important that the reviewing body have some independent
means of assessing the facts underlying the uses of force with regard
to both the alleged provocation and the reaction. Professor Bowett
stated: "[I]t is rarely satisfactory to rely entirely on the evidence
adduced by the parties." 2 Unfortunately, there are many situations
in which the states employing force will be the only ones who can
effectively gather the facts, slanted though they may be.
VI. THE ALTERNATIVE OF UNITED NATIONS
PROCEEDINGS
The U.N. Charter grants the Security Council a greater authority
to make decisions on the use force than is found in article 51. Under
article 39,233 the Council may dictate the use of force which is
229. William Safire, Slapping Saddam's Wrist, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,1993, at A17.
230. Id.
231. Bowett, supra note 184, at 29.
232. ld.
233. Article 39 of the U.N. Charter declares: "The Security Council shall determine the
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
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limited, in theory, only by the effectiveness of the Council's policy in
maintaining international peace and security. Thus, the Clinton
administration could have submitted its case to the Security Council,
and if it had gained approval from the Security Council, bombed
Baghdad without consideration as to whether the action was defensive
under international law. In this case the United States could have
chosen either a unilateral or multilateral response. Thus, the central
question confronting a long-term analysis of this situation is whether
the United States missed an opportunity to make the U.N. methods
of dealing with threats to the peace more effective, especially with
regard to terrorist activity.
The Clinton administration would have been limited had it gone
to the Security Council. The central concern in not bringing
politically intense incidents for the consideration of the Security
Council is the political nature of the United Nations. From both a
policy perspective, and a U.S. interpretation of international law, the
United States does not want to limit its freedom of action based upon
European, and especially Chinese, policy goals and legal interpreta-
tions. Furthermore, the desire to bomb Iraq that existed in the U.S.
military, political, and even journalistic communities may reflect a
feeling that there are elements of sovereignty that will not be given
up in certain situations, one of which is the ability to respond
unilaterally to assassination attempts on the state's past or present
leaders.
However, certain long-range U.S. policy goals would be served
by submitting the matter to the United Nations instead of taking
unilateral action. First, because the Security Council has been
effective in furthering U.S. policy towards Iraq in the past, bringing
such matters to the attention of the Council would further the process
of rehabilitating the Council's abysmal record of dealing with terrorist
violence.' Second, such action may encourage other nations to
bring equally significant concerns to the Council's attention and
therefore contribute to international stability. If an international
forum is willing to authorize action, states will have less of an
incentive to justify unilateral defensive reprisals. Lastly, the Security
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and
42, to maintain or restore international peace and security." U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
234. In fact, at the Security Council session following the bombing, Spain and Britain took
notice of the wider context in which the attempted assassination took place. This represented
a noticeable change from the Council's prior case-by-case analysis of reprisal actions. See supra
note 66 and accompanying text.
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Council's imprimatur would have given the administration's action
added international credibility.
The Security Council may well have proved ineffective in acting
against Iraq, either because of a Chinese veto or the concerns of U.S.
allies. Iraq may have taken such inaction as the green light to further
challenge U.S. and international concerns and, in effect, to try to
create a wedge between the United Nations and the United States.
If the administration then would have unilaterally bombed Baghdad
it would have shown absolute disregard for the United Nation's
decision-making ability. Therefore, the argument that the United
States should have gone through the Security Council, but disregard
any adverse decision, is plainly formalistic and unwise.
If it had chosen to submit its plan to the Security Council, the
administration would have faced difficult choices in presenting
evidence.' Even after the raid, the administration allegedly held
back its most damning evidence of Iraqi complicity in the assassina-
tion plot. 6  In order to convince the Security Council of Iraq's
culpability, the United States, in theory, would have been forced to
be more forthcoming in releasing evidence.
However, security reasons may dictate against letting the
members of the Council peruse classified material. For example, in
the cold war atmosphere of the 1986 Council debates concerning the
Reagan administration's bombing of Libya, there was little evaluation
of evidence linking Libya to the LaBelle Disco bombing or the thirty
other alleged Libyan terrorist attacks, despite the fact that Qaddafl's
future terrorist activities constituted the primary U.S. justification for
action. The Reagan administration also did not release classified
evidence underlying its claim that Libya planned terrorist attacks
around the world.
Without a means of gathering the underlying facts, the Security
Council will be unable to evaluate objectively the legal rights of
contending states. Professor Bowett, therefore, believes that the
Security Council must have an independent fact-finding capability.
However, unless the United Nations creates its own intelligence
service, it seems that the Council will not have unimpeded access to
classified material. The problem then is how to legally analyze what
235. Furthermore, the United States may be placed in the position of arguing novel legal
theories. For instance, if the administration had more definite evidence of additional threats
from Iraq, could the "accumulation of events" doctrine be used prospectively in order to justify
a defensive reprisal?
236. Hersh, supra note 18.
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may be done by a member if that member is the only one with the
information necessary for analysis.
VII. CONCLUSION
Expanding the conditions under which legally permissible force
may be used is no small matter. Professor Abram Chayes, Legal
Advisor to the U.S. Department of State at the time of the Cuban
Missile Crisis, commented on the danger of expanding the notion of
self-defense: "[T]he normative atmosphere in which states act, though
tenuous and impalpable perhaps, is affected by the earlier actions of
others and their accompanying statements of what they take the
governing law to be."' In his particular example of state-to-state
tension, Chayes warned of the danger of making "the occasion for
forceful response essentially a question for unilateral national decision
that would not only be formally unreviewable, but not subject to
intelligent criticism, either."' 38
An expansion of self-defense rights thus manifests a need for
both post-defense review and an incentive for pre-defense referral to
the United Nations, even with a right of unilateral action. The
practice of foreign relations, however, especially in the circumstances
surrounding the United States's involvement with Iraq, does not lend
itself to conclusive legal rules. The unspecified nature of future Iraqi
terrorist activity and concerns about the veracity of Kuwait's
allegations regarding the alleged bombing plot demonstrate the
importance of a process in furthering multilateral goals.
Developing state practice reveals that controversial military
actions, including reprisals, are becoming increasingly accepted as a
means of fighting terrorism. 9 Concomitant with an increased
ability to use force under international law comes an increased need
to define the limits of the permissible use of force. A new legal
standard to deal with terrorist attacks must be restrained by substan-
tive limits and procedural safeguards if the world is not to take a step
backward to a time when the use of force was casually justified after
the fact. Absolute legal doctrines are destined to fail under the
weight of changing circumstances. Central importance should thus be
given to the purpose of legal norms-to increase stability in interna-
tional relations.
237. ABRAM CHAYES, Ti CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 63-66 (1974).
238. Id at 65.
239. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
TERROR AND THE LAW 497
Alan D. Surchin
1995]

